The Ethics of Letting Die
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Saving someone from attempting suicide is glorified and is considered a heroic act. In this paper, I will argue that it is not always the right course of action. Suicide comes from subjective reasons why one’s life is not worth living anymore. A suicidal person sees no more value or meaning in life, and in many cases, their life is so full of hardships that they outweigh the good things experienced now and then, and so life becomes intolerable. In such a case, the subjective meaning that one gives one’s life disappears, and death seems like a desirable option, or at least, an easy way out of the unbearable suffering. This is when saving one from killing oneself not only is not the right choice, but prolongs one’s suffering, and that makes it an immoral course of action. Sometimes letting die is the right thing to do — for the sake of the dying person’s ease.
Introduction
Reports often praise a ‘hero’ who prevents someone from jumping off a bridge. Such acts are celebrated as unquestionably right, for saving a life is assumed good. Yet little attention is paid to why the suicidal person wished to die. Their decision suggests life no longer feels worth living, and this judgment is not for others to overrule. Religious perspectives claim life is sacred and must be preserved, but my concern lies elsewhere: the meaning of life for the suicidal person. I will examine reasons for choosing death and argue why this may, at least subjectively, be the right decision. Intervening is not always good; it can prolong suffering or prove pointless if the attempt recurs.
The purpose of this paper is to show why ‘letting die’ can sometimes be the moral choice. Suicide arises from the loss of subjective meaning, something only the individual can assess. Thus, saving them may not be heroic but instead harmful.
Meaning of Life
Everyone has a right to life, which means no one may end another’s life against their will or make it harmful. In a positive sense, some are obliged to save a life when possible. Yet I argue for an exception: one’s life should only be saved if one wishes to be saved. Chetwynd (2004, p.174) notes that if life has become unbearable, suicide may be acceptable. Though often applied to euthanasia, this principle should be general: life can be unbearable not only physically but also mentally, and the latter is no easier.
Perrett (1986, p.222) observes that most consider life worth living, but many undeniably prefer death or regret being born. Why is life joyful for some yet intolerable for others? Two answers suggest themselves: first, that life contains pleasures worth pursuing; second, that death is feared. Epicurus sought to dissolve this fear: death is nothing to us, for when we exist, death is not, and when death is, we are not.
My aim is not to show whether death should be desired but to argue that when death is desired, one should not be stopped. If a person sees no future but hardship, her wish for death is subjectively justified. Saving such a person does not always help. If life is unwanted, she should be allowed to decide how and when to die.
Those who intervene usually assume that no life is truly intolerable and that solutions always exist. Life is viewed as sacred and valuable. Yet, as Dilman (1968, p.548) says, “What is unintelligible is the statement that someone may find meaning in life for another person.” When the person herself finds no point, meaning is gone. Outsiders cannot force recognition of beauty or purpose.
Meaning is not external but given by individuals through desires, projects, and commitments (Burley, 2009, p.530). Desires fall into conditional and categorical forms (Williams; Wisnewski, 2005, p.28). Categorical desires drive us into the future, and when they exist, death appears harmful as it cuts off fulfillment. But when such desires vanish, life itself can lose appeal.
Some argue that eternal life would remove meaning by producing fatal boredom. Wisnewski responds that new desires may always arise. Yet this depends on life being bearable; for those whose hardships outweigh joys, eternal life would be dreadful. Human desires are finite, and for some, pleasures end early, leaving only emptiness. Cases of celebrities who commit suicide after success illustrate this finitude.
A suicidal person sees no more value in living. What does it mean to say life has meaning? One can distinguish objective and subjective meaning. Objective meaning refers to rationally defensible purposes, while subjective meaning is what one assigns personally. Life can be meaningful even in destructive ways, as with Genghis Khan, or benevolent ones, as with Mother Teresa. What matters is that meaning comes from goals. If goals collapse, life loses its point, whether finite or eternal (Russell, 1953). Saving someone whose life feels meaningless does not restore meaning; it may worsen the situation.
Some hold that mortality itself makes life meaningful. Death imposes a deadline, making time precious (Burley, 2012, p.539). Like a borrowed book, life’s value intensifies when it must soon end. Others argue mortality robs life of meaning: without afterlife, human greatness is no greater than that of animals (Adams, 2002, p.79). Adams nonetheless admits that meaning depends more on how life is lived than on its length (2002, p.80). I agree: achievements give life weight regardless of eternity.
Levine (1987) distinguishes terrestrial meaning — personal, subjective significance — from cosmic meaning, the grand purpose of life. Religions often locate meaning in divine order and afterlife. For the suicidal person, however, terrestrial meaning has collapsed, making cosmic meaning irrelevant. Even belief in an afterlife may not matter; all that is sought is relief from this life.
Death itself is not evil. Epicurus argued that when we die, we no longer exist and thus cannot be harmed. Fischer (2006) challenges this by invoking Nagel’s deprivation thesis: death deprives us of possible goods. Yet this applies only if life retains goods to be had. For the suffering, death ends hardship, not opportunities. Death is not the start of happiness but simply an end.
Therefore, when life becomes unbearable and meaning has disappeared, death may rightly be desired. Saving someone against her will often prolongs suffering rather than restoring value. If life is owned, then so too is the decision to relinquish it.
The Unwanted Consequences of Saving a Life
Life is a property, and its owner may choose how to dispose of it, provided others are not harmed. Suicide in cases of unbearable life should not be stigmatized, for saving someone against their will often fails to help.
There are different senses of saving. One may stop a suicide attempt without addressing underlying causes. This is futile, as the individual may try again. Alternatively, one may save by tackling the roots of despair — lifting poverty, offering therapy, or removing other burdens. Only the latter is genuinely helpful. If problems remain unaddressed, saving is pointless and prolongs suffering.
Momeyer (1982, p.309) calls voluntary euthanasia “suicide supported by strong reasons.” I argue that strong reasons exist not only in physical illness but also in mental suffering. Subjective reasons may be as compelling as objective ones, and it is unfair to dismiss them. A cancer patient’s pain and a depressed person’s agony are both real; both can justify wishing for death.
When life is saved against one’s will, consequences follow. First, autonomy is violated. Arras (1982, p.292) emphasizes that self-determination must be respected. The right to life entails a right to death, and preventing suicide denies this. Even if decisions arise from a troubled mind, they remain subjectively valid.
Second, saving reintroduces the option of life, which Velleman (2015) argues can itself be burdensome. New options create pressure to justify choices. A person resolved to die now feels forced to rationalize her desire against the imposed alternative. This pressure adds to suffering and fosters guilt, shame, or feelings of irrationality.
Third, saving is paternalistic. Paternalism assumes people cannot decide what is best for themselves, denying them control over even their death. For those who have endured uncontrollable hardships — poverty, illness, trauma — this last domain of autonomy may be the only control they possess. To strip it away is deeply disrespectful.
Hanser (1995) distinguishes between preventing “KLD-type” (Killing and Letting Die) deaths (significantly prolonging life) and “KLD-token” deaths (merely postponing one). Saving a suicidal person often amounts to the latter, offering little real benefit. Whether suicide constitutes a harm needing prevention is itself debatable, since the individual may view life as the greater harm.
The asymmetry is clear. If one is not saved, death ends suffering. If one is saved, outcomes divide: she may improve with treatment, or she may not, in which case suffering is prolonged. Thus, saving always risks the worst-case scenario, while not saving guarantees no further harm to the individual.
Examples illustrate this tension. Imagine someone suffering depression, extreme poverty, or facing cultural threats such as honor killing. Saving her from suicide without resolving these causes does nothing but add pressure and prolong pain. Therapy may help, but it is not always effective. The gamble is borne entirely by the one saved.
Ultimately, unwanted saving often inflicts harm: it disregards autonomy, burdens the individual with new pressures, and embodies paternalism. Unless saving directly addresses the root causes of despair, it is not heroic but intrusive. In many cases, letting die spares further suffering and respects the right of self-determination.
Further Thoughts and Implications
My aim is not to equate killing with letting die. The cases discussed concern individuals who choose to end their own lives for reasons they regard as sufficient. I am not advocating euthanasia or assisted suicide directly, though parallels exist. Nor do I claim others may decide for someone that death is preferable; suffering must be recognized as subjective unless objectively undeniable, such as in extreme physical agony.
Consider a scenario: if X is being eaten alive by wolves and Y has one bullet, Y may justifiably kill X to end the torment. Here, suffering is objectively evident. But if X is depressed, Y cannot intervene in the same way, for mental pain is subjective and cannot ground another’s judgment. Thus, no universal moral rule applies; each case must be understood in its context.
The real focus here is when life loses value despite such deadlines. Excessive suffering erodes love, joy, and achievement, leaving life unbearable. In such cases, death is not an evil but an escape, a gentle end to relentless hardship. Letting die, then, can be the humane response. To deny it is to prolong meaningless suffering and strip individuals of their last sphere of control.
Conclusion
There are two ways to look at the meaning of life: it can be a general, ultimate meaning, or it can be a sort of meaning that each person gives to her life. When one’s life becomes devoid of meaning, it is deprived of its value. This is when the bad things in life are heavier than the good things experienced (if anything at all), and that is when death can come as a gift and a relief. When this happens — when death is desired — it should not be taken away from the owner of that life.
Throughout this paper, I have been trying to establish that suicide or death in general can be a desired end to suffering. Suffering is a subjective situation, but sometimes it can be objectively proven. The focus of this paper was on situations where it is not easy to objectively prove that one is suffering, because the suffering is mental and not empirically measurable. This suffering, as mentioned earlier, can be of any shape, but what all of them have in common is that it outweighs the good of life and makes death a pleasant escape from the harm that is life in this case. If life could be a harm instead of death, then one is obliged to let the suffering end, even if that means letting the sufferer die.
Sadaf G. Zaki is a PhD student and Junior Research Fellow at the University of Tartu. Her research centers on metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, psychiatry, and logic, with a special interest in how abstract questions about identity, consciousness, and rationality intersect with the lived realities of mental illness.
Originally trained in mathematics, she discovered the philosophy of logic during her undergraduate studies and began teaching herself philosophy long before formally switching fields. She later earned a BA in philosophy in Turkey, completed an MA at Utrecht University, and is now based in Estonia for her doctoral work.
Sadaf G. Zaki on Daily Philosophy:
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